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Abstract
The use and acquisition of knowledge appears to be influenced by what hu-
mans pay attention to. Thus, looking at attention will tell us something about
the mechanisms involved in knowledge (usage). According to the present review,
attention reflects selectivity in information processing and it is not necessarily
also reflected in a user’s consciousness, as it is rooted in skill memory or other
implicit procedural memory forms–that is, attention is rooted in the necessity of
human control of mental operations and actions. The main assumption is that
what is true of processing in general is also true of knowledge: Its usage can-
not be understood, unless we have the means to study all mechanisms involved,
including knowledge hidden from direct introspection and knowledge that par-
ticipants are not willing to share with interrogators. Reviewing work done in
this context, I argue that experimental research on selectivity and bias in hu-
man information processing is a promising road to learn about the principles
governing knowledge (usage) and to reflect upon them.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Knowledge in Psychology: Truth vs. Introspection
The current review is concerned with the role of attention for human knowledge. I will
argue that to understand knowledge, it is necessary to use experimental investigations
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and objective performance evidence from a third-person perspective, and that it is
insufficient to rely on introspection and the corresponding reports alone. Superficially,
this might seem redundant in light of the many studies that used objective perfor-
mance measured from a third-person perspective to study knowledge (e.g., Schank &
Abelson, 2013; Pylyshyn, 1981). However, until today, vital areas of knowledge re-
search use introspection for far-reaching conclusions, sometimes with seemingly little
awareness of the methodological limitations. As an example take experimental philos-
ophy. Whether one refers to knowledge as a justified belief (but possibly a false one)
or only as a true belief, beliefs are central to many classical definitions of knowledge
(cf. Gettier, 1963). In recent years, experimental philosophers used questionnaires
about canonical thought experiments to conclude that human subjects’ epistemic,
moral and metaphysical beliefs vary significantly as a function of the exact side con-
ditions and the group of test subjects (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). What is often not
realized, however, is that questionnaires used to test human beliefs essentially ask test
participants to report based on their own introspections. Thus, these questionnaire-
based methods simply replace expert’s self-introspection about knowledge processes
involved in and revealed by thought experiments with potentially more representative
introspective data collected from laypersons. If methods of self-introspection are lim-
ited, as they are only sensitive to that part of a human subject’s own representations
that are accessible to consciousness, then these questionnaire methods are limited in
the same way as experts’ armchair introspections about the conclusions from their
thought experiments.
To start with, by some means or another, knowledge is related to truth (e.g.,
Gettier, 1963; Nozick, 1994; Williamson, 2000). As psychology is not concerned
with the exact definition of “truth,” pragmatically, knowledge in psychology requires
that a mental state or representation exists on the side of the knowledge bearer that
corresponds more or less to a (representation of a) state of affairs holding relatively
independently of the current state or representation of the knowledge bearer. This
second independent representation can be used as “ground truth” for comparison
with the current representation. In other words, in the following review, I will use
“knowledge” in a generic sense, defined as representations of content that one believes
with confidence or that are based on some type of reliable process. For instance, to
know I willingly broke a social rule at a dinner party, I could compare the intended and
the current consequences of my behavior: Based on my memories of past experience, I
would know if I had beliefs about what people do in such a situation and if I intended
people smiling at me and talking to me or if I intended to annoy them. This example
already shows why introspection, the view of one’s own mental representations from
a first-person perspective, is often involved in research on knowledge. In contrast,
from a third-person perspective (from the outside), it would be difficult to know the
exact beliefs of the agent, here, what she or he knew in advance, and what she or he
intended and, thus, to decide if she or he knew the social rule and broke it willingly,
or if she or he was lacking fitting “prior knowledge”.
1.2 Types of Knowledge and Experimental Psychology
More systematically, knowing of is only one form of knowledge, and introspection is
not necessarily the best way to study all of these forms of knowledge in each instance.
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What I want to make clear in the present review is that even in cases in which
explicit knowing of (or, for that matter, knowing about ; see below) is investigated,
introspection is by no means the best way to study this type of knowledge.
To start with, in general, knowledge can be subdivided into at least the following
three different types or forms. A first type of knowledge is knowledge of something
or someone, for example, when I recognize that the green and white object in my
garage is a bicycle or when I realize that the person in front of me is my dentist (cf.
Zagzebski, 2017). Here, it is already debatable if introspection is always required,
as recognition has also been studied by facilitated processing of repeated and, thus,
“known” information relative to entirely novel information. For example, if tested,
prosopagnosics–that is, patients showing strong deficits in introspective awareness
of their own face recognition capabilities and corresponding deficits in explicit face
recognition–showed the same performance advantage as healthy controls for already
presented faces compared to entirely novel faces in a same-different judgment task for
pairs of faces (cf. De Haan et al., 1987).
A second type of knowledge is knowledge about something or someone; for in-
stance, the knowledge that a bicycle is a vehicle or the knowledge that a dentist is an
academic (cf. Zagzebski, 2017). This is the type of knowledge that is often studied
by introspection, for instance, through interrogation or interview (Ericsson & Simon,
1980). A third type would be knowledge-how ; for example, the knowledge how to ride
a bicycle (cf. Pavese, 2017). In the case of knowledge how, or skill knowledge, it is
especially doubtful if introspection is the best way of studying this type of knowledge.
For instance, amnesics–that is, persons with explicit memory deficits, who are per def-
inition unaware of their own knowledge such that they oftentimes can simply not use
this knowledge–show comparatively less deficits of their skill knowledge or knowing
how. For example, despite their lack of explicitly knowing that they can successfully
perform on a task, amnesics can acquire and retain mirror writing skills at a similar
rate and for a similar duration as normal controls (Cohen & Squire, 1980).
Importantly, psychology identifies a number of ways in which these different types
of knowledge could interact (Anderson et al., 2004; Neisser, 1976). In particular, both
the usage of knowledge-of and knowledge-about requires knowledge-how, because all
knowledge use depends on temporally extended processing. This is important in the
context of the current review, as this is where attention comes in (see next Section).
As an example for the role of knowledge-how in knowledge-of, take a simple ex-
perimental task used in empirical psychology. Akin to knowledge-of or recognition, in
a (delayed) matching-to-sample task, participants in such an experiment first have to
encode a sample stimulus into memory for later comparison with a second stimulus
(e.g., Fuster et al., 1982). For instance, they might see a horizontal line as a sample
and are instructed to remember it for later comparison (i.e., matching), following a
retention interval, with a second stimulus. To fulfill the task demands and follow the
instructions, humans would set up a mental representation or template of the sam-
ple for later comparison with the second stimulus. After a temporal delay, a second
visual stimulus is presented, for example, a vertically oriented Gabor patch, and par-
ticipants have to compare it to the template to decide if the second stimulus matches
the sample. Depending on whether or not the stimulus matches the template or sam-
ple, participants would press one or another button as defined in the instructions.
Importantly, these types of processing imply that attention is involved in the usage
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of knowledge as will be explained next.
2 Attention
2.1 Attention and Selectivity
In the present article, attention is defined as the selectivity of mental and informa-
tion processing. This also covers instances of selectivity in memory, perception, or
reasoning. For instance, in the (delayed) matching-to-sample task described above,
participants would have to select the orientation of a line for encoding into memory
and for usage in a template for their comparison. The fact that this selection is not
self-understood but rather an achievement depending on an active and successful se-
lection, humans and animals can show substantial limitations of performance in the
(delayed) matching-to-sample task (Oscar-Berman & Bonner, 1985). In this context,
attention is used as a descriptive term to reflect both introspectively felt selectiv-
ity in conscious perception, recollection, and thought (cf. James, 1890), as well as
“observed” selectivity in objectively measured human performance in corresponding
tasks, for example, as humans’ accuracy in reporting if they registered any unexpected
stimulus in an attentional blindness experiment (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016; Mack
& Rock, 1998).
Importantly, the origins of this selectivity are not yet known, and they are prob-
ably heterogeneous. To understand this, consider the following example: To control
a pointing action successfully, humans would have to select information about the
spatial location of the to-be-pointed-at object. The necessary information about the
spatial location is provided by visual input. However, to be of any use for the monitor-
ing and control of the grasping action, the visual coordinates would have to undergo
several different transformations, as the rotating shoulder, elbow and wrist–all in-
volved in the pointing action–would carry different spatial degrees of freedom and,
thus, require monitoring and usage of different spatial coordinates from the visual
input (Soechting & Lacquiniti, 1981). Formally, any such input-output transforma-
tion corresponds to a selection or filtering process, where (visual) input and (motor)
output are related to one another by a transfer function (see Figure 1).
One can easily see how such transformations of information create different forms
of selectivity depending on the exact purpose of information usage. For instance, for
focusing of the eyes, visual distance would need to be translated into the rolling of
the eyes toward or away from the nose and into the elongation or shortening of the
lens (e.g., Mays et al., 1986). In this sense, an appropriate view of selectivity or of
attention requires to consider that the possibility of heterogeneous origins, meaning
selectivity should not be mistaken to be (only) the consequence of one shared control
mechanism (Kahneman, 1973).
This point is crucial to the current argument, because if thinking of attention as
being the mere consequence of a limited resource that needs to be shared among dif-
ferent tasks, stimuli, or channels, one can easily miss a critical point: that attention is
omnipresent, as it is often more extreme than would be suggested by limited resources
alone. Attention, viewed as selectivity in psychological processing, is not just taking
a toll on processing efficiency where the conditions are taxing. Humans also routinely
show surprising selectivity where this would not be predicted by resource limitations.
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Figure 1: Function relating input to output.
Depicted is an example of an input-output function. Such transfer functions describe which
input states correspond to which output states and can take on almost any form. They can be
used to describe transformations of sensory input into motor output, but also transformations
of one Representation X into a different Representation Y. Critically, such transformations
show selectivity. For instance, in the depicted graph, for areas of the transfer function outside
of the broken lines, the output is the same, regardless of the exact input value–that is, the
input differences of Representation X are lost in the output Representation Y. Such input-
output functions, therefore, already illustrate filtering or attention: selection of some inputs
and disregard of other inputs.
To understand this argument, take the example of human short-term memory rec-
ollection of salient colors in a simple visual memory experiment. Typically, humans
can hold an estimated three to four objects (together with their features) in visual
short-term mind (Luck & Vogel, 1997). However, if asked to look at either a disk or
a ring surrounding the disk, many participants only note the color of the single rele-
vant object and had no recollection of the color of the irrelevant object, so that these
participants could only report the color of the disk but not that of the ring if asked
to look at the disks (Eitam et al., 2013). (In control conditions, in which participants
had to look at both objects, memory of the two color was near perfect.) This point
is critical, as the origins of such selectivity have more to do with selection being part
and parcel of habitual processing routines, with little introspective awareness of the
corresponding limitations on the side of the processing human.
2.2 A Different Perspective
Therefore, in the current review, a different perspective on attention is taken. Ac-
cording to the present view, attention is selectivity following from the fact that some
type of features or stimuli are highlighted in an individual’s criteria or template rep-
resentations used in the routine or skilled and, thus, implicit forms of control and
monitoring of the success of information processing: By and large, selectivity of infor-
mation processing owes to the particular way humans make use of information, and
this is by far not always something that would be maximally efficient (i.e., that would
make use of capacity to maximal degrees) and that humans would notice and be able
to report. In other words, what applies to overt actions applies to any temporally
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extended processing and, thus, to any use of knowledge.
Knowledge processes can carry characteristics of selectivity imposed by the way or
means in which the processes are carried out. For example, in the case of knowledge-
of, if humans have to keep two templates in mind in a (delayed) matching-to-sample
task, they show evidence of selectivity imposed by the neural machinery on which the
processes of recognition are carried out. Specifically, in the matching-to-two-templates
task, one can observe rhythmic fluctuations between templates – that is, of the use
of only one template at a time: When asked to hold two line orientations in memory,
participants’ average accuracy of performance for stimuli matching to Templates A
versus B took turns with about 8 Hz frequency (Pomper & Ansorge, 2021; see Figure
2). This is in line with known oscillations of brain activity in attention-dependent
tasks (e.g., VanRullen, 2018), meaning that much as in the case of an overt action,
characteristics inherent to the physical device by which a process is carried out – here,
temporal synchronization or neuronal activity as a way to organize brain activity –
can impose forms of selectivity on processing in the service of knowledge usage and
acquisition (VanRullen, 2016, 2018).
In essence, there might be better ways of how humans could strategically organize
this type of information processing that make full use of known capacity up to its
limits. However, definitely the usage of one template out of two templates at a time
would be a successful habitual way to solve the delayed matching-to-sample task, as
separate testing of each template in turn could maximize a human subject’s certainty
about whether or not information regarding each particular template was missed. In
other words, rather than relying on their known maximal capacity, humans oftentimes
seem to prefer “maximized selectivity” and the fact that the corresponding efficiency
limitations are introspectively not noticed might even support their ubiquity.
3 Studying the Role of Attention (Selectivity) in
Knowledge
In theory, such characteristics of knowledge and the principles of knowledge use can
be studied in one of two ways. First, they can be investigated introspectively. In this
case, humans draw on their inner representations of what they perceive themselves
they do when using their knowledge. Alternatively or complementary, however, the
principles can also be studied from a third-person perspective by observations of char-
acteristics of overt performance reflective of the underlying (use) of knowledge. Here,
one would typically employ a performance measure, such as participants’ percentage
correct responses or response speed, and experimentally vary conditions systemati-
cally to investigate which principles are characteristic of knowledge. We have already
explained that, intuitively, many intricate knowledge processes that require compari-
son of several mental representations can most easily be assessed from a first-person
perspective. Historically, this has also been the first take on the issue as I will explain
next. However, strikingly, only by using the latter experimental third-person perspec-
tive methods one can identify important characteristics of the processes involved in
knowledge creation and usage. This will be explained later.
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3.1 Introspection, Again
To illustrate both methods, consider first selectivity in consciousness as studied with
introspection from a first-person perspective. In the early days of psychology, when
it just calved off of philosophy as an independent academic discipline, scholars un-
derstood psychology mostly as being concerned with human consciousness (Wundt,
1896). In this phase, at the end of the 19th century, early psychologists, noticed selec-
tivity among their own thoughts and ideas introspectively. This observation figured
in various forms in early consciousness psychology. According to Brentano (1874), for
example, each conscious state is characterized by intentional inexistence. Intentional
inexistence corresponds to a twofold selectivity, where the inexistential object denotes
the specific (and, therefore, selective, i.e., contrasting with other potential) content
of consciousness at a particular moment in time, while the intention characterizes the
particular (and, thus, equally selective) qualitative way in which the object is referred
to in consciousness. Brentano labelled his objects as inexistent, as they would have
to exist inside of consciousness (i.e. they are in-existent objects) only but would not
have to exist outside of consciousness (i.e. they may be non-existent objects).
When we consider the various forms of intentions by which humans could refer to
inexistent objects such as remembered, imagined, dreamt, or perceived, it becomes
clear how, for example, an imagined object, such as Pegasus with Headphones being
present in each atom, would not have to exist outside consciousness. A closer inspec-
tion of the qualitative distinction between intentions would maybe even suggest that
the particular intention of imagination is contrastively defined against perception and
memory as referring to an inexistent object that is neither “currently present” outside
of consciousness in the moment of its experience (as in perception), nor having had
to be experienced as present outside of consciousness at some point in the past (as in
memories). However, Brentano generally acknowledged a difference between inexis-
tent objects and“their counterparts”outside consciousness, and, therefore, inexistence
was characteristic of all conscious objects. This was the case even for perception and
memory, although the experienced correspondence between objects inside and outside
consciousness might have been higher in the latter cases. Just as a side note, it should
be obvious that selectivity in consciousness à la Brentano, thus, also covers typical
cases of knowledge.
Take James as a second example for how introspectively felt selectivity in con-
sciousness figured in early psychological theorizing. According to James (1890), hu-
mans experience a stream of consciousness, in which the content of consciousness
changes across time, implying that at each moment in time, only part of all potential
content is selected for consciousness. As a final example, in Wundt’s theory of ap-
perception, attention was the productive force that generated conscious percepts out
of elementary sensations (Wundt, 1896). In contrast to James and Brentano, Wundt
also already relied on “objective”, here, experimental evidence from a third-person
perspective in addition to introspection. For instance, the so-called “complication ex-
periments” nicely demonstrate the workings of attention as a form of selectivity in the
service of consciousness. In these experiments, humans gave bimodal judgments by
noticing the time at which they heard a tone by registering and reporting the position
of a visual digit swiftly running on a clockface. In one condition of the complica-
tion experiments, the times between tones varied unsystematically from one tone to
the next, while in the other condition, the tones were presented rhythmically, with a
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fixed interval between successive tones. It turned out that the visual clockface time
at which participants noted (or reported) the tone was shorter under rhythmic than
under varying interval conditions.
Researchers such as Wundt interpreted these experimental findings as evidence for
the role of attention, here, as selection of sensations, for apperception and conscious-
ness: Participants’ report of the visually perceived time of the tone was shorter in
rhythmic than in varying conditions, as the exact point in time at which the selection
of the auditory sensation was required was easier to anticipate in rhythmic than in
varying conditions.
3.2 Experiments (Third-Person Perspective Evidence)
In contrast to these early days, following an era in which psychology was dominated
by Behaviorism (roughly until the middle of the 20th Century), with the cognitive
turn attention reoccurred as a research topic in psychology once more, but was now
defined in operational rather than experiential terms, lending itself more easily to
experimental investigation through “objective” performance measures of speed and
accuracy observed from a third-person perspective rather than through (additional)
introspective (first-person perspective) reports (cf. Broadbent, 1958). An example
would be the precision of recall of different messages from attended-to and from
unattended-to ears, where a different auditory message would be presented to each
ear of the participant in an experiment, but where the participant would have to
attend to only one ear and would have to ignore the other ear (Cherry, 1953). In such
experiments, it was regularly found that recall of the messages from the attended-to
ear was much more accurate than from the unattended ear. Following an information-
processing metaphor, under the perspective of cognitive theory, human perception
works like the transmission of information from the environment through the senses
and towards diverse human processing functions such as memory, action control, or
reasoning (cf. Broadbent, 1958).
Critically, already the earliest studies of attention under this cognitive theoretical
perspective confirmed selectivity, now of information processing, reflected in objective
performance measures (e.g., in the number of recollected stimuli presented to an at-
tended ear versus an unattended ear), rather than in terms of conscious experience as
in psychology’s early days (Cherry, 1953). In fact, the term consciousness was often
not used by these researchers at all–rightly so, as was confirmed in subsequent stud-
ies showing that selection in information processing can occur without concomitant
awareness of this selection. For example, although experiments on visual search for
relevant targets (e.g., searching for a red target stimulus, somewhat analogously to
searching for a friend with a red suitcase that you want to pick up at the station)
among irrelevant distractors (e.g., searching for the target among green, blue, yellow,
or black distractors, somewhat similar to searching your friend among other passen-
gers coming off the same train) are probably typically concerned with the conscious
perception of the stimuli in these studies, it was repeatedly shown that visual search
can also be (partly) performed on the basis of stimuli of which the human observer
remains entirely unaware (Ansorge et al., 2009; Jaśkowski et al., 2002; Woodman &
Luck, 2003). This is part of the full performance, as in these cases, evidence shows
that attention is directed to only those unaware stimuli that resemble a searched-
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of closed-loop feedback circuit of procedural control.
Procedural control in a closed-loop system works similarly to any feedback loop. The input
(e.g., a text) would be checked for fitting content by the controller (i.e., a steering value,
e.g., a template to search for references referring to knowledge) to be processed (e.g., read
and note references) until a measuring element signals that the purpose is fulfilled (e.g., no
further references could be found in a text).
for target feature, though participants do not literally conclude visual search under
unaware conditions.
Even though such task performance is not completed, it is clear that this type of
selection serves the purpose of the task. The underlying reason is that selectivity of
human information processing is adaptive or necessary for control of mental proce-
dures and of actions and that the corresponding purposes of selectivity or of attention
can be fulfilled without mediation through conscious representations (cf. Ansorge et
al., 2014; Neumann, 1987, 1990). In general, per definition, psychological processing
unfolds across time: To serve their various purposes, these processes need to be geared
by specified (though changing) criteria defining both critical starting conditions to be
met to elicit processing as well as by criteria to stop or alter processing (Anderson
et al., 2004; Miller et al., 1960). This is illustrated in Figure 3 and is the general
form of any mental procedure, be it an overt action, based on movements of parts
of the body, or a covert process, without accompanying body movements (Anderson
et al., 2004). For example, if I would want to grasp an apple from a tree, I would
have to select one of the apples for an adaptive or successful action: This would be
necessary to select the apple’s location and its size as steering values of the action to
successfully reach in its direction and to open the fingers so that they can grasp the
apple (Allport, 1987).
The same type of necessary selectivity applies to covert processing. For example,
if I would want to draw a valid conclusion in a categorical syllogism, I would have
to select the terminus major of the major premise (e.g., “no line is a point”; with
the major term in italics) and the terminus minor of the minor premise (e.g., “all
verticals are lines”; with the minor term in italics) and would have to relate them
to one another by the middle term (here, “line”) to judge if a conclusion (e.g., “no
vertical is a point”) is true.
Even more important for what follows, each usage of knowledge for just any human
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mental or information processing purpose requires its encoding into and retrieval from
memory. Though it might be an exaggeration to conclude that any limitation of the
active part of memory–that is, working memory–involved in such tasks essentially re-
flects an attentional bottleneck (cf. Barrouillet et al., 2004), selectivity and, hence, at-
tention is a characteristic of any working-memory processes and, hence, of knowledge
usage (Oberauer, 2002). Thus, the current perspective denies the strict separation of
semantic (knowing-of, knowing-that) and procedural (knowing-how) knowledge and
memory (cf. Squire, 1986), as it follows that each usage of knowledge, including its
coming to being in one human mind (through encoding it at one point into mem-
ory, be it also shortly only) also corresponds to the sketched general architecture of
procedures and, thus, requires attention in the form of specific selections gearing the
process.
These selections take different forms. The criterion of selection of, for instance,
retrieved information may be determined at will as when we deliberately search our
memory for what we know about the relation between verticals in particular and lines
in general. However, the selection from memory might also occur without our will as
when a memory “pops up.” For example, when we try to decide if a vertical is a point,
we might remember the view of a vertical flagpost from an aerial perspective above,
such that the vertical appears as a point. In such cases of automatic retrieval, we
sometimes are not certain if the knowledge (or memory content) is adaptive at all. In
any case, selectivity would be also implied, as the corresponding memory would not
be just of anything. Instead, on closer inspection, it typically turns out that there are
semantic connections between our currently intended usage of knowledge and pop-
out memories or automatic retrieval of knowledge. In other words, these pop-out
memories or automatic knowledge usages are related to our ongoing willed processing
but show a degree of generalization of application to semantically related or otherwise
similar but not quite currently useful content or context outside the specific instances
for which willing retrieval would make sense.
Importantly, here it becomes obvious that processing of knowledge implies a two-
step selection: Not only is it necessary to select currently pertaining input from the
senses or from memory by means of their comparison to the steering values of the
procedures (kept in the controller in Figure 1); it is also necessary to select the steering
values themselves (cf. Bundesen, 1990). This is illustrated, for example, in Reason’s
(1990) error theory of procedural processing. According to Reason, omissions (e.g.,
walking from one room to the other to fetch a book and coming back without the
book) or perseverations (e.g., turning the key a second time to start your car after
you have already started the car) as two types of errors reflect the erroneous choice
of a procedure’s steering value. In the case of the omission, for example, at the time
you were in the other room you would have failed to check and make sure that the
purpose of coming over was fulfilled, here, to fetch the book.
To understand that the nature of retrieved and used knowledge, thus, depends
on the choice of an appropriate steering value is important, as there is evidence that
there are biases in the choice of steering values that impact (1) the type of knowledge
used or (2) the way that knowledge is used and that can go undetected from an in-
trospective, first-person perspective. This is important, as the choice of the steering
values determines how knowledge-related processing is characterized. Thus, such un-
detected biases in the choice of steering values are a source of constraints on the usage
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of knowledge and, hence, a factor that requires more investigation and consideration
for the optimal usage of human knowledge.
4 Procedures and Selectivity
Above I have argued that attention, understood as selectivity, is a characteristic of
procedures as they unfolds across time. In the following, I give two examples of
empirical support for this assertion. To note, both examples make clear that intro-
spection or its report alone are probably insufficient to understand the characteristics
of knowledge usage.
The first example is from visual search. In visual search, participants search for
relevant targets (e.g., ripe berries) among irrelevant distractors (e.g., unripe berries)
in their visual environment (Wolfe, 2015). To that end, humans (e.g., participants
in an experiment on visual search) select a criterion, template, or steering value that
allows them to successfully discriminate between target and distractors such that
the targets can be found and the distractors ignored (e.g., the color in the case of
the berries where ripe berries are red and unripe berries are green) (cf. Duncan &
Humphreys, 1989).
Now it happens, however, that humans do not only have a single (search) intention
or that a single (search) intention would translate into different criteria or steering
values. Consider the following example: You are at a friend’s party and have to
search for a bottle opener in her kitchen drawer full of kitchen utensils (cf. Yang &
Zelinsky, 2009). In this situation, you cannot easily pick a particular color or shape
as a template or steering value to successfully search for the bottle opener, as a bottle
opener could take on different colors and shapes. In such situations, humans might
want to use several (search) criteria or steering values at the same time (cf. Duncan
& Humphreys, 1989; Irons et al., 2011).
From a first-perspective perspective, it is difficult to judge how we might do this.
There seems to be general consensus that it is difficult to use more than maybe four
such search criteria at the same time, acknowledging the fact that these criteria would
have to be kept in an active state (e.g., corresponding to their current usage during
search) in working memory (Olivers et al., 2011). As working memory itself has a lim-
ited capacity of about three to four features or objects, it seems that some selectivity
in the number of currently used steering values or search criteria is implied (cf. Luck
& Vogel, 1997). This roughly corresponds to what we would judge introspectively:
When we have to keep an arbitrary number consisting of several digits in memory, it
should not be too long for its successful retrieval, and three or four such items are
definitely manageable, but somewhere beyond maybe seven items, we would definitely
have to rehearse the material to some extent to keep it in mind.
4.1 Visual Search Criteria
However, when we conducted an experiment and looked into the capacity of visual
search criteria currently in use, we found evidence from a third-person perspective
that participants even only used a single search criterion at a time (Büsel et al.,
2019). In each trial of a computer experiment, we presented our participants with a
visual target at one of several positions and asked our participants to find the target
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and report its orientation (i.e., if the target, a letter T, was tilted to the left or to the
right). In one block of trials, the target always had the same, known color (e.g., it was
always red). In the other block of trials, the target could take on one of two known
colors (e.g., in half of the trials, it was red, and in the other half, it was green), but
which of these colors the target took on in the upcoming trial was not known to our
human participants in that experiment. In this situation, we observed switch costs
and mixing costs in the condition with two target colors relative to the condition with
a single target color, pointing to the participants’ usage of only one of these colors
as a search criterion at a time (cf. Kiesel et al., 2010; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In
this context, mixing costs denote the longer time needed to search for a target of a
particular color (e.g., red) in the two-color blocks than in the single-color blocks, even
if the target in a current trial (Trial N ) is of the same color as in the preceding trial
(Trial N−1). Switching costs, in contrast, denote the longer time needed to search for
a target of a particular color (e.g., red) in a Trial N if the color in the preceding Trial
N − 1 was different (e.g., green) relative to similar (e.g., red). Especially, the latter
switch cost is indicative of the fact that only a single color was used as steering value
for search per each trial, so that a change of this steering value delayed searching for
the targets.
At this point, it might be objected that switch costs might have reflected partic-
ipants deliberate checking of which color was presented to increase their certainty.
To note, in the context of these experiments, it was not necessary to discriminate
between the two relevant colors, as both served the same purpose: To find the tar-
get. Thus, it is unclear what would be gained by ascertaining which exact color of
the two relevant colors was presented. More importantly, however, from my func-
tional perspective on selectivity, this is not necessarily an “alternative” explanation
but possibly an elaboration of the reasons for forms of hyper-selectivity that exceed
selectivity predicted on the basis of capacity limitations: A sequential usage of one
feature template at a time is probably easier to track for its success in whether the
current input matches the feature template and, thus, the usage of a single feature
template at a time might indeed serve the purpose of increasing one’s own certainty
that relevant input was registered. Furthermore, the mixing costs are also indicative
of a related cost of having to maintain two steering values, although mixing costs
might also be due to longer processing times if central capacities to keep information
in working memory are indeed limited. In addition, several lines of evidence agree
with our conclusion that only a single steering value could be used actively at any
time (Oberauer & Hein, 2012; Ort et al., 2017), and, although some authors believe
that maybe more than one steering value could be maintained at a time (Bahle et al.,
2020; Kerzel & Witzel, 2019; Pomper & Ansorge, 2021), the number of such simulta-
neously entertained steering values is certainly finite and, thus, selectivity is always
implied.
This extreme hyper-selectivity of only one feature at a time makes clear that
knowledge usage comes with constraints that can be easily overlooked if we do think
of knowing-that or knowing-of in isolation–that is, without considering that knowing-
how, the active processing of the knowledge, is required for our knowledge to come
into psychological existence. In addition, with introspection alone, such regularities
of knowledge, in this case, its extreme momentary selectivity to a single used feature
at a time, are difficult if not impossible to register.
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4.2 Polarity-Correspondence Effects
The second example comes from polarity correspondence effects in studies on color-
valence associations. As I will explain below, such polarity correspondence effects
also reflect a strong form of selectivity. As with the example above, awareness of
the polarity correspondence principle is low, such that the corresponding influences
have been identified with third-person observations of objective human performance
in experiments only. To start with, at least in Western cultures and in more “implicit”
classification tasks (i.e., tasks in which a dimension varies but is not itself part of the
instructions), red is more likely associated with negative affective valence than green;
and, vice versa, green is more likely associated with positive affective valence than
red (e.g., Kawai et al., 2021; Kuhbandner & Pekrun, 2013).
In this context, we used an experiment and tested if such color-affect associations
could have reflected a polarity-correspondence effect (cf. Proctor & Cho, 2006). In
our study, participants had to classify words such as “birthday” or “prison” as positive
versus negative (Kawai et al., 2020). These words were equally often presented in red
or in green. It turned out that categorization of word valence was faster under con-
gruent conditions, with negative words in red and positive words in green, than under
incongruent conditions, with negative words in green and positive words in red, al-
though color was task irrelevant. This reflected an implicit (i.e., not directly explicitly
rated) association between color and affective valence, but when a more explicit and
introspective judgment of color-valence associations is required, humans also mention
associations between red and positive emotions, such as love (e.g., Jonauskaite et al.,
2020). So what is going on?
When we looked closer into the experimental performance that reflected a red-
negative association, we found out that the effect was restricted to blocks of trials in
the experiment in which both colors–red and green–were presented in an intermixed
fashion. Between color-homogeneous blocks, in which all negative and positive words
were presented in the same color (green in some blocks, red in other blocks), however,
no such congruence effect was found: Categorization time for positive words was
always lower than categorization time for negative words, regardless of whether the
words were green or red.
These findings are in line with the polarity correspondence principle. According to
the polarity correspondence principle, humans assign polarities–plus versus minus–to
opposing feature values (e.g., red vs. green, below vs. above, etc.) on the same feature
dimension (e.g., color, vertical location, etc.). In our study, participants, thusly, as-
signed positive polarity to the positive words and to the green color and they assigned
negative polarity to the negative words and to the red color. As a consequence, con-
gruence relations between valence and color polarity resulted in mixed color blocks.
However, in color-homogenous blocks, there was simply no contrasting pole in the
color dimension that would have suggested polarity assignments of plus and minus
poles to the different colors, hence, no polarity-correspondence effect between colors
and affective valence in these blocks. Critical in the context of the current discussion,
polarity assignments are a way of selectivity imposed by procedural control, here of
dealing with the necessity to decide between alternatives. To understand this, con-
sider the required decision between the different category memberships for each target
word as either belonging in the category of positive words or in the category of nega-
tive words. To solve this task, participants could first compare each word’s meaning
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to one category definition as a steering value, say the category of positive words. Only
then, participants would switch to the second, alternative category definition, say of
negative words. This type of decision by sequential comparison of words with alter-
native categories as steering values would then typically show a bias to start with the
positive category and to proceed to the negative category in case the words cannot
be classified as belonging to the positive category. Participants would “inadvertently”
apply a related type of categorical decision to the irrelevant stimulus dimension, here,
to color, if this irrelevant stimulus dimension shares important characteristics with
the relevant dimension, here, of suggesting coding alternative features consistently as
prioritized/positive or less prioritized/negative poles, too.
Importantly, one can immediately see that, again, procedures, here categorical
decisions, would show an extreme form of selectivity–the use of only a single steering
value at a time–, just as was observed in the case of visual search. Furthermore, in line
with this interpretation, we also found (1) the expected facilitation of the plus-pole
decisions (as these would be prioritized in a sequence of two comparisons, with first
a comparison to the plus- and then to the minus-pole steering values) and (2) the
predicted weaker congruence effect (i.e., incongruent minus congruent decision time
difference) for the minus-pole congruent pairs (here: negative words in red) relative
to the minus-pole incongruent pairs (here: negative words in green), as in this case
facilitation by two minus pole decisions in congruent conditions benefiting one another
and, thus, decision time would be undermined by counteracting facilitation of a plus-
pole decision for the color of an incongruent comparison case (i.e., for the green color
of a negative word) (cf. Lakens, 2012).
5 Automatic Processing: Biased Selections
In general, not all human selections are willingly initiated, and this is also the case for
the choice of human steering values for the control of knowledge-related processing.
In general, procedures that are elicited relatively independently from one’s own will
reflect either innate tendencies to prioritize selections or biases based on extended
practice of particular procedures (cf. Öhman et al., 2001; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
In both cases, the tendencies and biases generalize to novel situations, as long as stim-
uli fitting to the steering values of the automatized (e.g., highly practiced) procedures
are present in these situations that then can activate the corresponding procedures,
thereby, reversing the typical order of first selecting a procedure and only then select-
ing stimuli fitting to the steering values of these procedures.
Many of these automatic selections occur in the context of procedural processing
devoted to other purposes and, more importantly, automatic selection can also depend
to some degree on the control and use of these alternative procedures. As an example,
consider the inadvertent processing of self-related knowledge as being self-related when
this knowledge has to be categorized together with knowledge less related to the self.
In the Concealed Information Task (CIT), investigators aim at revealing suspects
knowledge of identity- or crime-related information that the suspect would rather
want to hide from revelation (Seymour et al., 2000; Suchotzki et al., 2017; Varga et
al., 2014). For instance, if a murder has been committed, a guilty suspect would have
knowledge of the details of the crime, such as the weapon used. However, the suspect
would rather want to hide her knowledge during interrogation. Obviously, in such
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cases, where a person seeks to hide her knowledge, introspection would also work and
guilty suspects should be aware of their knowledge, but guilty suspects would maybe
not want to report their introspective insights.
5.1 Interference by Self-Related Information in the Concealed
Information Test
In this situation, the CIT, an experimental task, could be used to reveal the knowledge.
Critically in the context of the present argument, the CIT also reveals important
insights on the mechanism by which attention or selectivity operates in the usage of
knowledge, namely the above mentioned inadvertent usage of the steering value for
the relevant targets to the only personal knowledge of the to-be-concealed crime- or
identity-related knowledge. In the CIT, suspects are asked to categorize a number of
stimuli, for instance, several potential murder weapon labels (e.g., the words “rope,”
“gun,”“knife,” etc.) and a single of these stimuli that is not the true crime weapon
would be designated as the target that requires categorization by pressing one key and
all other stimuli would require categorization by pressing an alternative key. Among
the non-targets, however, there would be two types of stimuli–irrelevants, which were
not used for the murder, and the probe, which is the true murder weapon (e.g., “gun”).
Only for guilty participants, the probe would stand out as a less frequent stimulus
being more related to oneself and known to be associated with the crime among all
the irrelevants being less related to the self and the crime, with which latter the probe
has to be jointly categorized as irrelevant. In other words, just as the rare target, the
probe stands out as relatively rare among the irrelevants by its higher self-relevance.
By this resemblance in terms of its lower frequency, the probe would then invite
more target-like categorization and create some response conflict–that is, interfer-
ence by its resemblance to the target as a rare stimulus inviting more of a target-
categorization response than all of the other irrelevants. This self-relevance depen-
dence of the probe categorization difficulty for guilty participants would then show
up as a probe-irrelevant reaction time difference, with longer categorization times for
probes–with more response conflict–than for irrelevants, with their lower response
conflict.
In other words, the inadvertent and unwilled processing of the probe as special
among the irrelevants would depend on the way of procedural control or steering
values, in which low frequency of occurrence is an (implicit) target-defining feature
and the probe resembles this feature, offering itself to selection through the same
steering values as are used for the target. In line with this interpretation, using
(rare) self-related fillers (e.g., the word “MINE”) that have to be categorized together
with the target and using frequent other-related fillers (e.g., the word “OTHER”) to
be categorized together with the probe and irrelevants increases the probe-irrelevant
reaction-time difference (Lukács & Ansorge, 2021; Lukács et al., 2017; see Table 1).
This finding supports the conclusion that it is the self-relatedness of the probes that
makes these items stand out among the irrelevants and that accounts for response
conflict. In addition, the probe-irrelevant difference decreases drastically if the fre-
quency of fillers in the target category is increased decreasing their similarity to the
rare probes (Lukács & Ansorge, 2021).
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Table 1: Reaction times and accuracies from a Concealed Information Test study by Lukács
& Ansorge (2021).
Means and SDs (in the format of M±SD) for individual reaction time (RT) means and ac-
curacy rates of Experiment 2 of Lukács & Ansorge (2021); for Probe (participants’ own
to be concealed names), Irrelevant (other people’s names), Target (the designated irrele-
vant that requires a different response), P – I (individual probe minus irrelevant values);
for two Semantic Context conditions (Target-Compatible, where filler items referring to
the self and familiarity were categorized together with the probe and irrelevants and filler
items referring to others and unfamiliarity were categorized together with the target; and
Target-Incompatible, where filler items referring to the self and familiarity were categorized
together with the target and filler items referring to others and unfamiliarity were catego-
rized together with the probe and irrelevants). T. = Target; Comp. = Compatible; Incomp.
= Incompatible; F = Familiarity-Referring; U = Unfamiliarity-Referring.
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5.2 Interference by Information Related to Grammaticalized
Distinctions
Having, thus, demonstrated how one’s own knowledge (here: knowledge-related stim-
uli) can influence processing even against one’s own will to not reveal such influence,
we now turn to the possibility that stimuli can trigger their fitting procedures even in
situations in which the procedures are entirely task-irrelevant. This has been shown
in studies on linguistic relativity. Linguistic relativity denotes the purported influ-
ence of the language that one speaks on perception and processing in general (Sapir,
1941/1964; Whorf, 1956). We studied this influence by comparing Korean speak-
ers’ and German speakers’ sensitivity to attend to features reflected in grammati-
calized–that is, highly practiced–linguistic distinctions (Goller et al., 2020). Korean
speakers, but not German speakers, have to discriminate between degrees of spatial
fit between objects–tight fits (“nohta”) versus loose fits (“kkita”)–by distinct verbs. In
contrast, in German, the corresponding distinctions can also be expressed either by
verbs or by prepositions. However, as the distinction is only obligatory in Korean but
not in German, only Korean speakers have extended practice with the distinction,
and they need to pay attention to the decisive differences between objects in their
environment when it comes to verbal descriptions of these elements.
Critically, if linguistic relativity holds true, the corresponding differences in select-
ing the relevant information during visual perception between Korean and German
speakers should generalize to non-linguistic tasks. Even in such non-linguistic tasks,
the corresponding higher bias to pay attention to these features among the Korean
speakers should take effect, as it is not necessary that first an intention to use a cor-
responding feature as a steering value to discriminate if a sentence requires a tight-
versus loose-fit verb is necessary: Instead, the mere presence of the corresponding
stimuli should be able to trigger the highly practiced procedure. This hypothesis
was tested and confirmed in a non-linguistic visual search task for color (cf. Baier
& Ansorge, 2019), in which Korean and German speakers were asked to search for a
color-defined target (e.g., search for a red target cylinder) among green non-targets
(cylinders) and presented a tight-fit or loose-fit singleton distractor (here, a cylinder-
piston relationship) away from the target in some of the trials (Goller et al., 2020; see
Figure 4).
We hypothesized that, as the distinction between tight- and loose-fit relations is
highly practiced among the Korean speakers, their attention should be captured by the
fit singletons away from the targets although the fit singletons were completely task-
irrelevant and although the color-defined target was never presented at the position
of a fit singleton. We expected this capture of attention away from the targets to
delay successful target search among the Korean speakers but not among the German
speakers, as the latter should be relatively less biased to the same distinction.
This hypothesis was supported by our findings. In comparison to a condition
without irrelevant fit singleton, only the Korean speakers but not the German speakers
needed more time to find the target in conditions with a fit singleton presented away
from the target. This distraction likely reflected the capture of attention away from
the target and to the fit singleton. In addition, this interference by the fit singleton
was not due to generally more attention capture by just any singleton distractor (e.g.,
due to maybe generally less ability to control procedures among Korean speakers):
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Figure 4: Illustration of a search display from Goller et al. (2020).
The image shows a display with a color-defined target and a fit distractor presented away
from the target. Korean speakers but not German speakers needed more time to search
for the target with such a distractor singleton in the display than in displays without such
distractor singleton. This is in line with Korean speakers highly practiced usage of the
fit relations (i.e., if tight or loose) for the choice of the appropriate verbs: a practice that
increases sensitivity to the corresponding features even outside linguistic tasks proper, and
a practice not shared to this extent by German speakers.
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In a control condition, with color singletons rather than fit singletons, in line with
prior findings, the same degree of interference was observed relative to a baseline
condition without a color singleton among Korean and German speakers (Theeuwes,
1992; Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 2019). In addition, in a further control experiment, it
was shown that among Korean speakers interference by a fit singleton was restricted
to visual search for color targets among 2D depictions of 3D objects but that the
same interference was absent for 2D color targets and distractors. The latter finding
supports the linguistic origin of the effect, as the Korean speakers obligatorily use
distinct verbs to discriminate between the tight- and loose-fit relations of 3D objects
but not of 2D objects. In this way, it was possible to show that the differences between
the language groups were not just due to a higher bias toward just any type of spatial
context among Asian than among Western samples (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005).
6 Conclusion
In summary, humans show biases among the steering values necessary for the control
of their procedures. These biases reflect prior knowledge that is sometimes difficult to
suppress as seen in the example of the inadvertent processing of probes in the CIT and
that is sometimes even difficult to notice without proper objective experimental tests,
as indicated by the automatic selection of fit singletons among Koreans. However as
reviewed above, experiments at least allow humans to understand the influences of
such biases of prior knowledge and on knowledge-based processing. As such experi-
ments help to reflect upon these biases in knowledge-related processing. As all usage
of knowledge is through procedures and as each procedure requires some degree of
selectivity, experimental research is, thus, a potential way to keep the corresponding
biases at check when it comes to the usage of knowledge.
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